Abstract-In the vein of the recent "pretty strong" converse for the quantum and private capacity of degradable quantum channels [Morgan/Winter, IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 60(1):317-333, 2014], we use the same techniques, in particular the calculus of min-entropies, to show a pretty strong converse for the private capacity of degraded classical-quantum-quantum (cqq-)wiretap channels, which generalize Wyner's model of the degraded classical wiretap channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most outstanding successes of Shannon theory [23] is Shannon's information theoretic treatment of cryptography [24] , and the further development at the hands of Wyner, who introduced the wiretap channel model [36] . While the achievability part for the wiretap channel is a wellunderstood combination of channel coding and privacy amplification techniques, the converse, even the weak converse, of the generalized wiretap channel required a new idea in Csiszár and Körner's contribution [3] .
Characteristically, for multi-user scenarios strong converses are hard to come by and not known in many instances. The presence of an adversary in the wiretap setting, albeit a passive one, makes the wiretap capacity a multi-user problem, and until recently only weak converses were known for Wyner's original problem [3] , [36] . The same was is true for the "static" versions of distillation of shared secret key between Alice and Bob from a prior three-way correlation with Eve [1] , [18] , where Tyagi and Narayan [28] , Tyagi and Watanabe [29] , and Watanabe and Hayashi [33] made progress only recently. Most recently, Hayashi, Tyagi and Watanabe [15] (see also their [14] ) have given an elegant, very insightful analysis of strong converse rates for general classical wiretap channels, yielding the complete strong converse in the degraded case.
Here, we extend their results somewhat to the quantum case, looking at wiretap channels with classical input but quantum outputs, so-called cqq-wiretap channels. Instead of the elegant hypothesis testing method developed in [15] , we use a rather more blunt tool, the min-entropy calculus [22] , [27] . Hence, while we can treat channels not amenable to the method of [15] , we do not reach a complete understanding of the full tradeoff between decoding error and privacy.
II. CQQ-WIRETAP CHANNEL AND STRONG CONVERSE
The model we consider is that of a discrete memoryless cqq-wiretap channel:
with a finite set X and finite dimensional Hilbert spaces B and E, of legal user and eavesdropper, respectively. Furthermore, we shall assume most of the time that the channel is degraded, meaning that there exists a quantum channel
† . The objective of wiretap coding is for Alice to encode messages in such a way that Bob can decode with small error probability, and that Eve cannot distinguish messages except with small probability. To quantify errors, we use the purified distance
with the fidelity F (ρ, σ) = √ ρ √ σ 1 between quantum states [16] , [30] , see [27] .
An n-block code of transmission error and privacy error δ for W consists of a stochastic map E :
the following hold:
Here,
is the maximally mixed state, and ρ E n is a suitable state on E n . The largest number M of messages under these conditions is denoted M (n, , δ). Then, the private capacity is defined as the largest asymptotically achievable rate such that transmission error and privacy error vanish in the limit, i.e.
Theorem 1 (Devetak [6] ; Cai/Winter/Yeung [2] ) Let W be a cqq-wiretap channel. Then its private capacity is given by P (W ) = sup n 1 n P (1) (W ⊗n ), where
Here, the maximum is over joint distributions P U X of the channel input X and an auxiliary variable U , and the mutual informations are with respect to the state
For degraded channels, it is given by the single-letter formula
where the maximum is over distributions P X of the channel input, and the conditional mutual information is with respect to the state
In other words, w.l.o.g. one may assume U = X, and the regularization is not necessary [13, Appendix A] .
For completeness, we recall here the definition of the quantum information quantities: For a state ρ on a quantum system X, the entropy is S(X) = S(ρ X ) = − Tr ρ log ρ, the mutual information for a bipartite state ρ XY is I(X :
, and the conditional mutual information for a tripartite state ρ XY Z is I(X :
It seems to be unknown whether in the cqq-wiretap channel setting the regularization above is necessary, but it is quite clear that the single-letterization in the classical case, by Csiszar and Körner [3] , does not work, due to the use of chain rules, we would get information quantities conditioned on quantum registers. Furthermore, the results of Smith, Renes and Smolin [26] suggest that P (1) does not give the private capacity. On the other hand, in the general quantum channel case [2] it is well-known that the regularization is necessary: For an isometry, such that Eve's channel is the complementary channel to Bob's, there are instances where P (1) is strictly smaller than P [11] , [17] , [25] , [26] . Also if the eavesdropper's channel is a degraded version (even trivially) of the authorized channel, and the latter is quantum, P
(1) can be strictly smaller than P , as observed in [13] .
Here we show the following pretty strong converse:
where the implicit constant only depends on 1 − − 2δ. In particular, under the above assumptions,
Its proof relies on the calculus of min-and max-entropies, of which we will briefly review the necessary definitions and properties; cf. [27] for more details.
Definition 3 (Min-and max-entropy) For ρ AB ∈ S ≤ (AB), the min-entropy of A conditioned on B is defined as
With a purification |ψ ABC of ρ, we define
with the reduced state ψ AC = Tr B ψ.
Definition 4 (Smooth min-and max-entropy) Let ≥ 0 and ρ AB ∈ S(AB). The -smooth min-entropy of A conditioned on B is defined as
Similarly,
with a purification ψ ∈ S(ABC) of ρ.
All min-and max-entropies, smoothed or not, are invariant under local unitaries and local isometries.
The following two lemmas show that min-and maxentropies have properties close to those of the von Neumann entropy.
Lemma 5 (Data processing) For ρ ∈ S(ABC) and ≥ 0,
Lemma 6 (Chain rules [10] , [31] ) Let , δ ≥ 0, η > 0. Then, with respect to the same state ρ ∈ S(ABC),
Proof of Theorem 2: We follow closely the initial steps of the analysis in [19, Thm. 14] . Consider an n-block code with M messages, and transmission and privacy error and is δ: message u (chosen uniformly) is encoded by a distribution E(x n |u) and sent through the channel, giving rise to a ccqq-state between message U , input X n , output B n and environment E n :
The "trivial" converse shows that
cf. Renes and Renner [21] . Namely, according to the definition of privacy given above, the reduced state ρ U E n is within purified distance δ of a product state of the form
is within purified distance from the perfectly correlated state
We apply the Stinespring dilation of the degrading map to ρ, yielding
With respect to this state, we now have (cf. Eq. (18) of [19] ),
with λ := + 2δ + 5η. Here we have used the degradability property of the channel in the second line, in the third line twice the chain rule for min-/max-entropies [Lemma 6, Eqs. (3) and (4)], and in the last line data processing (Lemma 5) for the max-entropy. Indeed,
which we apply with F n ≡ A, U ≡ B and E n ≡ C, and with κ = + 3η. Now, assume for simplicity that the distribution of X n , i.e. the density ω X n , is supported on a single type class
where F (x|x n ) is the relative requency of the letter x occurring in x n . With this assumption we show how to bound the max-entropy terms on the r.h.s. of Eq. (5). Namely, all x n having non-zero probability are permutations of a fiducial x n 0 . Hence, on the one hand, we have
by Lemma 7 (quasi-concavity of max-entropy) below, with λ = λ √ 2 − λ 2 < 1, and a simple extension of Proposition 8
(asymptotic equipartition property) to a product of blocks of
. On the other hand, going to the S nsymmetrized state
we have, once more invoking Lemma 7,
where in the second line we have used Lemma 10. Now, the uniform distribution Υ P0 on the type class τ (P 0 ) has the property Υ P0 ≤ (n + 1) |X | P ⊗n 0 , because it is on P 0 that the probability weight of type classes of P ⊗n 0 peaks, and so
Thus, using the same reasoning as in the proof of [19, Thm. 2], we get
where we have once more invoked the AEP, Proposition 8. Inserting these upper and lower bounds into Eq. (5), we find log M ≤ nI(X : F |E ) + O n log n .
Now we face the case of general encodings, and reduce it to the above form of constant type. Introduce another register T holding the type t(x n ) of x n , of dimension |T | ≤ (n + 1) |X | , so that we have an extended joint state
Imagine that T is handed to the eavesdropper; this clearly doesn't increase Bob's decoding error, but it can affect the privacy of the code. The idea is, however, that since log |T | ≤ O(log n), we can rectify this by hashing out O(log n) of the message, and the remainder will be almost as private as the original code: Indeed, let = + 2ϑ and δ = δ + 2ϑ, such that still
sets L u of equal size L = poly log n, ϑ −1 , up to a rest of size smaller than L, so that we can label the elements of u L u by pairs
. Compute U as a function of U (except for an event of probability ≤ 1 N ), so that we obtain a joint state
. This is a new code: By the properties of random hashing, with high probability, Bob can apply the same decoding as in the original code to obtain an error ≤ + ϑ, and the privacy error for the combined register E n T is ≤ δ + ϑ. Furthermore, the privacy error of the register T alone is ≤ ϑ. This has the important consequence that we can modify the encoding E(x n |u ) to a slightly different one E (x n |u ) = Q(t(x n ))E (x n |u , t(x n )), with a universal distribution Q over the types, such that
fulfills the decoding and eavesdropper constraints with transmission error and privacy error δ , and has a perfectly independent type-register T .
Consider now the codes obtained by using E (·|·, P 0 ) for a fixed P 0 (but always the same decoder for Bob). These have transmission errors (P 0 ) and privacy errors δ(P 0 ). By the direct sum over types P 0 -with probability Q(P 0 ) -, and the concavity of √ 1 − x 2 , one can see that
and so
and so there must exist a type P 0 such that the encoding E (·|·, P 0 ) has (P 0 ) + 2δ(P 0 ) ≤ + 2δ < 1. But this code has only O(log n) less information in the message, and has the property that the encoder maps only into the type class τ (P 0 ), hence can use the previous bound:
concluding the proof.
Lemma 7 (Lemma 10 in [19] ) Let ρ ∈ S(AB) be a state and consider the state family ρ
, with unitaries U i on A and V i on B, and probabilities p i ; define ρ :
Proposition 8 (Min-and max-entropy AEP [22] , [27] ) Let ρ ∈ S(H AB ) and 0 < < 1. Then,
More precisely, for a purification |ψ ∈ ABC of ρ, denote µ X := log (ψ X ) −1 , where the inverse is the generalized inverse (restricted to the support), for X = B, C. Then, for every n,
and similar opposite bounds via Lemma 9.
Lemma 9 (Proposition 5.5 in [27] ) Let ρ ∈ S(AB) and α, β ≥ 0 such that α + β < π 2 . Then,
For , δ ≥ 0, + δ < 1 this can be relaxed to the simpler form
Lemma 10 (Dupuis [9] ) Let ρ ∈ S(AB) and 0 ≤ ≤ 1.
which can be rewritten and relaxed into the form (0 ≤ δ ≤ 1)
III. DISCUSSION
We showed that the min-entropic machinery employed in the analysis of degradable quantum channels [4] , [7] , [19] , can be used equally, if not more easily, to obtain a pretty strong converse for degraded quantum wiretap channels of the cqq kind; the reason for focusing on this class of channels lies in the availability of a single-letter formula.
For degraded ccc-wiretap channels, i.e. the original Wyner model, Hayashi, Tyagi and Watanabe [15] have found a very elegant argument, via hypothesis testing, to give the tighter result that if + δ < 1, then lim n→∞ 1 n log M (n, , δ) = P (W ). In fact, by phrasing error and privacy in terms of the trace distance D(ρ, σ) = 1 2 ρ − σ 1 ≤ P (ρ, σ), they show that this holds if and only if: For 1 − δ ≤ < 1 the above limit gives the classical capacity C(W ) of the channel from Alice to Bob. It seems however that their technique does not easily generalize to cqq-channels, as it exploits the classical nature of the output signals.
Similarly, if and δ are "too big", namely √ 1 − δ 2 ≤ < 1, we can easily see that Theorem 2 breaks: In that case, |. This scheme has transmission error arbitrarily close to and privacy error ≤ √ 1 − 2 ≤ δ. By ignoring the privacy constraint, our Theorem 2 includes a proof of the strong converse for the classical capacity of cqchannels [20] , [35] ; simply consider a trivial eavesdropper and δ = 0. This shows that for < 1, the limit of 1 n log M (n, , δ) is bounded by C(W ); cf. Wang and Renner [32] . We leave it as an open problem to try and close the gap between the two regimes (see Fig. 1 ).
